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Abstract— We propose a framework for the design and 
optimization of a secure self-optimizing, self-adapting system-on-
chip (S4oC) architecture. The goal is to minimize the impact of 
attacks such as hardware Trojan and side-channel, by making 
real-time adjustments. S4oC learns to reconfigure itself, subject to 
various security measures and attacks, some of which possibly 
unknown at design time. Furthermore, the data types and patterns 
of the target applications, environmental conditions, and sources 
of variations are incorporated. S4oC is a manycore system, 
modeled as a four-layer graph, representing the model of 
computation (MoCp), model of connection (MoCn), model of 
memory (MoM) and model of storage (MoS), with a large number 
of elements including heterogeneous reconfigurable processing 
elements in MoCp, and memory elements in the MoM layer. 
Security driven community detection, and neural networks are 
utilized for application task clustering, and distributed 
reinforcement learning (RL) for task mapping. 
Keywords—Community detection, distributed RL, 
heterogeneous manycore, machine learning, multi-valued logic 
PUF, ternary computing.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
To cope with increasing complexity of data and applications 
as well as energy consumption related issues, the trend has been 
to utilize multi/manycore platforms for modern architectures.  
Such architectures are traditionally designed using a 
combination of full-custom, semi-custom ASIC (Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits) and FPGA components with area, 
performance or energy as the main goal. They mostly include 
homogeneous components with hardware and software 
solutions separately designed and added to them. E.g., to exploit 
the high degree of parallelism available on such platforms, 
programmers typically write multithreaded applications where 
multiple threads are spawned and mapped onto the cores by the 
operating system (OS). These threads share data by storing one 
copy of the data into the data cache. If one thread updates the 
shared variable, the same new copy must be broadcast to the rest 
of cores for consistency. Network-on-Chip (NoC) has been 
proven effective for data transfer among cores. For each core, 
i.e., a processing element (PE), there exists a router, i.e., a 
connecting element (CE) to transfer data from one node to 
another and the CE keeps track of the next node to which data 
should be sent. However, there are drawbacks associated with 
such platforms: (1) Each core may be designed to be simple, 
general, and possibly homogeneous. In addition to the 
performance and power dissipation issues related to such cores, 
the simplicity, and homogeneity of such platforms and their data 
movements, creates vulnerabilities that could jeopardize the 
security of functionality and information [1]-[10], and (2) 
Countermeasures to security attacks may not be sufficient in 
case those threats evolve.  
We envision a systematic design, verification and 
optimization flow for manycore systems from top system level 
behavioral view, down to layout (i.e. spec to gdsii), which is 
driven by security goals and performance and energy 
constraints. This flow would deliver a system-on-chip (SoC) that 
learns to reprogram and reconfigure itself even in real-time in 
the event of new security threats. Our self-optimizing, self-
adapting secure SoC, called S4oC, provides flexibility, 
programmability, and performance/energy efficiency that are 
demanded for complex applications in heterogeneous systems 
[11]-[20]. S4oC is domain specific and uses various static and 
real-time approaches to address security. We construct a four-
layer security-aware graph model of the S4oC system, namely 
computation, connection, memory and storage layers to capture 
the task activities while they are mapped onto the S4oC 
elements. At compile time, the high-level programs of the target 
applications are converted to our low-level virtual machine 
(LLVM) intermediate representation (IR) instruction set, which 
is LLVM IR compatible, with plugins accounting for security.  
Next a hierarchical task graph model is constructed from the 
LLVM IR instructions accounting for task dependencies. An 
offline learning process using NN classifiers is applied to learn 
special features related to functionality and security including 
unknown effects. Community detection (CD) is used to partition 
the hierarchical task graph into non-overlapping clusters. 
Considering the dynamic, uncertain nature of data, hardware, 
and security threats, the runtime steps of task scheduling and 
resource reconfiguration are performed by distributed RL based 
scheduler agents. In the following, we present a summary of 
common security threats and their countermeasures. We then 
present the components and flow of S4oC (cf. Figure 1). 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section presents a summary of common hardware 
security threats and countermeasures.   
A. Hardware Attacks 
Side-Channel: The adversary monitors certain design 
parameters such as those related to power, thermal, latency, and 
electromagnetic radiation behavior of the system, from which it 
attempts to gain some secret information, e.g., about the 
implementation of the system (such as the CNN model [9]) or 
certain private keys. It closely observes the primary and side-
channel outputs and examines the variations in the side-channel 
and primary inputs. It aims to correlate those inputs and outputs 
to be able to derive the secret information [1]-[10].  Due to 
implicit and at times unknown nature of side-channel attacks, 
they are extremely efficient in evading present-day hardware 
security techniques. 
Hardware Trojan: Malicious modifications to an existing 
circuit with the goal of changing or controlling the functionality 
of the circuit, stealing its secret information, degrading its 
reliability, performance, etc., or result in denial-of-service [20]-
[32]. They may be added to the circuits during any phase of the 
design cycle, including fabrication, or earlier, by manipulating 
the RTL code or modifying the macros during RTL design and 
synthesis. Also, EDA tools may contain malicious code that 
collects secretive data in IPs (Intellectual Properties).  
IP Piracy: Any illegal form of using an IP, IC or SoC. 
Including stealing and claiming ownership [33]-[36]. It typically 
manifests itself in the form of overbuilding and illegally selling 
an IP. The malicious foundry can overbuild ICs without the 
consent of the designer and sell the excess ICs in the gray 
market. Counterfeiting is another form of attack where the 
attackers illegally imitate the original design. 
Reverse Engineering:  A process which aims at identifying 
and understanding the design, functionality and structure of the 
integrated circuit [37]-[42]. Reverse engineering of integrated 
circuits has been a common practice in design verification and 
commercial piracy investigation. However, the technique can be 
misused by the adversary for the purpose of stealing and even 
pirating the design. For instance, starting from the design layout, 
the adversary can obtain the transistor level netlist and 
ultimately the gate level netlist. They can therefore use the 
netlist to build their own circuit or sell the stolen design illegally. 
In case of an unknown module, the functionality can be 
identified based on Boolean satisfiability checks or behavioral 
comparison to known components. 
B. Countermeasures 
The following is a brief overview of the solutions that may 
address one or more of the security threats.  
Physical Unclonable Functions: Cost-efficient 
cryptographic primitives that exploit the sources of variations in 
the chip components (e.g., the SRAM modules). PUFs generate 
random values that would be unpredictable even for an attacker 
with physical access to the system. Among the sources of 
variation, environmental factors such as temperature, supply 
voltage and electromagnetic interference, as well as circuit 
aging impacts the quality of PUFs. It is therefore crucial for a 
PUF to be different among different circuits while remaining 
robustly unchanged on the same circuit [43]-[49]. In [48] a PUF 
for reconfigurable circuits is presented that can be embedded 
into the design’s HDL. 
Metering: A set of security mechanisms and protocols to 
provide designers with post fabrication capability of tracking 
their design, by monitoring the number of produced ICs, their 
properties and possibly even controlling them remotely [50]-
[59]. Some of the metering techniques are based on PUFs. 
Metering can be classified into active and passive techniques. 
Passive methods could be looked at as indenting of serial 
numbers on each device physically. Active metering equips the 
designer with not only product identification, but also control.   
Multi-Valued Numeral Systems: To make it computationally 
expensive for the adversary to identify private keys by 
computing in non-binary or mixed-radix. Prior work has shown 
how a mixed binary and ternary computing can be used to 
enhance security, e.g., in enhancing the security of cryptography 
calculations [60]-[68]. Mixed radix is also capable of enhancing 
the performance. A core may perform computation based on a 
hybrid binary, ternary, quaternary and multi-radix number 
systems, to explore the security vs. energy/performance 
tradeoffs. 
Logic Encryption and Obfuscation: Based on adding extra 
circuitry to hide the functionality of the design. Adversary 
would need a valid key to be able to unlock the circuit for normal 
operation. Therefore, the goal of logic locking is to make it 
impossible for the attacker to identify the keys. The extra logic 
would then help in encrypting the original design. The key 
inputs are stored in an on-chip tamper-proof memory. The 
additional logic which is added to the original circuit may 
consist of logic gates, multiplexers, lookup tables, or their 
combinations [69]-[82]. Designers provide the secret keys post 
fabrication, which means attackers cannot easily derive 
information about the circuit through brute force attacks because 
in the absence of the keys, the design produces wrong results. 
The intentional obscuring of the design used for securing 
sequential circuits is typically referred to as the logic 
obfuscation [83]-[88]. State obfuscation can protect ICs against 
hardware trojans, reverse engineering and piracy.  
Watermarking: The process of embedding certain 
information such as a signature into the design to be able to later 
trace its ownership and deter infringements [89]-[95]. 
Differently from hardware metering that aims for a unique tag 
for every chip, watermarking seeks to assign the same tag to all 
the chips produced from a specific design. Watermarks can be 
embedded in the sequential part of the IP by adding additional 
stages and transitions in the FSM, or by adding some special 
constraints at the various synthesis stages of the ASIC and 
FPGA design flows. Watermarking should not affect the actual 
functionality of the IP. Furthermore, copying or removing it 
should not be straightforward. Although IP watermarking serves 
well for proving authorship of an IP, it cannot prevent the 
adversary from gaining information about the IP. 
Camouflaging: Mainly a countermeasure to adversarial 
reverse engineering, and typically based on designing circuits 
with logic cells whose layouts look alike but differ in their 
functionalities. Once the adversaries wrongly interpret the 
functionality, they will obtain netlists which are different from 
the original one. For example, camouflaged NAND and NOR 
gates are built to look the same in layout, with the type of 
contact, i.e., real vs dummy as the only difference. While a real 
contact electrically connects two layers, but a dummy contact 
creates a gap in between the layers and thus electrically they are 
not connected. Prior work [37] showed that camouflaging, using 
an efficient algorithm to choose a handful of gates may slow 
down adversarial reverse engineering. However, a combination 
of SEM images and applying input patterns to the circuit to 
generate the output, may significantly shorten the time for the 
adversary to identify the camouflaged gates [96]. 
Split Manufacturing: Originally developed to enhance the 
fabrication yield, but more recently for security purposes as 
well. It is simply to divide the integrated circuits netlist into 
multiple parts and fabricate each of them at a different foundry, 
so that no single foundry gets access to the complete IC design. 
This process typically provides higher levels of security in 
comparison to other countermeasures against the various 
hardware-based attacks [97]-[99]. Split manufacturing 
processes typically divide the layout into two parts, namely 
Front End of Line (FEOL) and Back End of Line (BEOL) each 
of which to be fabricated in different foundries. The FOEL 
layers consist of transistors and some lower metal layers and are 
manufactured by an untrusted foundry and the BEOL layers 
consist of higher metal layers and are manufactured by a trusted 
foundry. Therefore, an adversary in the untrusted foundry has 
access to a partial netlist only. 
Hardware Trojan Counteracts: the methods are categorized 
as: (1) Detections [100]-[102], (2) Design for security [103]-
[105], and (3) Runtime monitoring [106]-[107]. Detection is the 
technique that determines whether a trojan exists in a piece of 
IC. Design for security increases the difficulty of trojan insertion 
or facilitates the detection of trojans. Runtime monitor is on-chip 
monitoring for hardware trojans during runtime. Detecting 
hardware trojans is challenging, because the modularity, 
hierarchy and regularity of custom and programmable IC design 
techniques necessitate numerous soft, firm and hard IPs, all of 
which exposed. The shrinking of layout geometries makes 
trojans harder to detect. Trojans get activated by certain rare 
conditions, which exacerbates the detection challenge. The 
detection techniques need frequent updates, as they may not 
work for new hardware trojans.  
III. S4OC FRAMEWORK – GRAPH MODELING 
We propose a hierarchical multi-layer graph model for our 
S4oC framework. There are two sets of graphs, namely the S4oC 
architecture graph set and the task graph set.  
A. Multi-layer S4oC Architecture Graph Set 
The computation, connection, memory, storage activities 
and their interconnected dependencies related to the S4oC 
architecture are constructed in four graph layers, namely the 
model of computation (MoCp), model of connection (MoCn), 
model of memory (MoM), and model of storage (MoS) layers. 
Each node in the four-layer graph of the S4oC architecture 
represents a processing element (PE), connecting element (CE), 
memory element (ME) or storage element (SE). Each node has 
a type, e.g., the type of a PE could be CPU, GPU, PUF, ASIC or 
specialized HWA (hardware accelerator) for Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT), matrix multiplication (MM), cryptography, 
homomorphic encryption, hyperdimensional computing, etc. 
Each node also has a parameter available, to record the 
availability level of the node (e.g., available = 0 means 
completely busy). Also, a link between two elements, e.g. a 
connection between a PE and a CE, is modeled by an edge. Each 
edge has a maximum bandwidth utilized as part of data transfer 
optimization.   
B. Hierarchical Task Graph Set 
The target applications running on S4oC are modeled based 
on complex hierarchical graphs. At the topmost level, a graph is 
defined whose nodes represent the applications and edges define 
any inter-application dependency. The application dependency 
may be the result of a security measure, where two applications 
must cooperate with each other to enhance security. Each 
application node may have a preferred logic type which could be 
non-binary, to further boost security. For instance, an 
application may be set to run on the S4oC elements that operate 
in ternary, quaternary or binary-coded ternary (BCD). 
At a lower level, the tasks associated with each application 
are modeled based on an instruction dependency graph (IDG). 
A set of tasks is modeled as an IDG, TS. Nodes of TS represent 
the tasks and its edges represent messages to be transferred 
among the tasks. A task is modeled as a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) T. Nodes of T represent the LLVM IR instructions. Data 
dependency between any two instructions in T is modeled by an 
edge, whose weight represents the amount of data to be 
transferred. Note that the IDG is the collection of the DAGs of 
all the applications. Each task may have a preferred execution 
affinity, so that it would be designated to certain PE type(s) for 
security and/or performance improvement purposes. Therefore, 
in order to improve the execution quality, tasks with a preferred 
execution affinity should be mapped to their most beneficial 
elements. For example, a task with loops may be mapped to a 
GPU type PE to improve performance whereas a task involving 
large matrices should not be sent to a CPU type PE. The two 
graph sets, namely the architecture graph and task graph sets can 
be used for analysis and optimization purposes. The S4oC 
framework solves the following problem: Given the architecture 
graph and task graph sets, cluster the tasks, map them onto 
S4oC, and reconfigure the S4oC elements, such that security is 
maximized, subject to certain performance and energy 
constraints. 
IV. S4OC FRAMEWORK – FLOW AND COMPONENTS 
In this section, we describe the security driven flow and 
operations of S4oC, which can be grouped into two stages, 
namely compile time resource allocation and runtime resource 
management and reconfiguration. Resource allocation includes 
application transformation, learning, and community detection 
(cf. Figure 1). At compile-time, S4oC transforms applications 
into a complex graph and determines the type and location of 
features, logic type, etc., using neural networks (NNs). During 
training, sample applications are driven into the NNs to learn 
specific features with emphasis on the security measures, such 
as side-channel power, thermal, or memory activity profiles to 
protect the S4oC IPs from adversary [9],[40],[36], perform 
watermarking, metering and obfuscation [51],[94] and detect 
any hardware trojans [20],[107]. The trained NNs have the 
capability of mining hidden structures in the new unseen 
applications. Next in the flow, is to partition the task graph into 
interdependent clusters with minimized data communication. In 
addition to energy and performance benefits, data 
communication minimization may further enhance security. 
Community detection (CD) on multi-layer graph is the main 
engine for partitioning. S4oC manages the resources and 
reconfigures the elements in real-time, using security driven RL 
based on distributed intelligent schedulers. To optimize for 
security, the schedulers explore the best elements and 
configuration onto which heterogeneous tasks should be 
mapped, according to the corresponding application demands as 
well as the availability of computing, connecting, memory and 
storage elements. The heterogeneous elements of S4oC include 
reconfigurable cores, ASIC cores, modules for HW acceleration 
of machine learning applications, and modules for security 
purposes such as cryptographic, non-binary numerical, PUF 
(physical unclonable function), metering, watermarking, etc., 
some of which may adapt in real-time, considering the existing 
environment and with the help of the intelligent schedulers.  
S4oC flow includes a verification framework that benefits 
from simulation, semi-formal and formal methodologies [108]-
[111]. RL is used to generate all possible sequences of input test 
vectors needed to approach a target state as well as the 
corresponding path to the target state which contains a potential 
design bug. The design bugs could be related to circuit 
functionality or highlight a security loophole. This process is 
equipped with SAT solvers to help find the transition vectors. 
The verification framework also utilizes NNs to accelerate the 
verification of complex data paths in the target states. Certain 
security measures (such as side-channel related) are analyzed 
based on assertions and properties as part of the process. The 
quality of verification is measured in terms of verification 
coverage and time.  
A. Compile Time Security Driven Resource Allocation 
The objective is to find the optimal application task 
partitions considering potential attacks (side-channel, Trojan, 
etc.), as well as the functionalities such as loops, FFT, and MM 
to exploit the underlying reconfigurable heterogeneous NoC-
based hardware platform. In our prior work [17] we have 
demonstrated the effectiveness of learning using NNs in 
assisting modularity-based CD to form clusters of tasks, with 
certain features, such as common functionality types (e.g., loops, 
FFT, or MM), common logic type and processing affinity. Such 
features are used in S4oC aiming for security. 
S4oC first applies NNs to find and detect the special features 
that exist deeply in applications. Those features help identify 
certain tasks with specific security or functionality needs and 
map them to S4oC elements accordingly. Our NNs attempt to 
learn features related to unknown security threats [112]-[129]. 
A.1) Low-Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) 
LLVM is a set of compiler technologies that provides 
intermediate representation (IR) as a common model for 
program analysis, transformation, and synthesis [130],[131]. 
LLVM IR utilizes an architecture based on load/store 
instructions to transfer data, e.g., among registers, caches, and 
memory banks. LLVM IR based compilation provides language 
independence for the representation of high-level languages 
such as C/C++ and for building retargetable compilers. It also 
helps avoid low-level actions such as register spilling and 
function prolog/epilog insertion. It therefore provides a suitable 
representation for program analysis and optimization in terms of 
various metrics such as energy and security [132]-[134].  
We model target applications by constructing the 
corresponding IDG task graph set. First, we execute the 
applications to collect dynamic LLVM IR like traces.  S4oC 
version of LLVM IR includes plugins to account for security 
features as part of the LLVM instructions. For instance, a hybrid 
of various numeral systems, such as binary, ternary and 
quaternary as well as multi-radix instructions are used. Second, 
we analyze the traces to figure out whether source registers of 
the current instruction depend on destination registers of the 
previous instructions. If data dependencies exist, we insert edges 
in between. Third, these instructions are profiled to get the 
precise data size as edge weights in IDG. Therefore, our 
approach combines static and dynamic program analysis. Static 
analysis means that we perform program dependency analysis to 
construct the graph. Dynamic analysis means that we run 
applications with representative inputs to get the dynamic IR 
traces because memory dependencies cannot be resolved 
statically. An example dynamic trace is shown below [17]:  
%4 = and %2, %3; 
%5 = mul %2, %4; 
%6 = add %4, %5; 
    The second instruction is dependent on the first 
instruction, as the second instruction’s register %4 depends on 
the destination register %4 of the previous instruction. Similarly, 
the source registers %4 and %5 of the third instruction depend 
on the destination registers of the previous instructions. As 
shown in our SOSPCS framework [17], the time complexity of 
application transformation is O(NlogD) where N is the number 
of IR instructions and D is the number of different destination 
registers, with D much smaller than N. 
A.2) Security Aware Learning 
During testing and simulation, we use new applications, but 
from the same domain as those in the training testbenches, e.g., 
those with cryptographic needs [135]. When new applications 
arrive, we first transform them into IDGs. Based on the graphs 
and their metrics, we prepare input data for the NNs. As part of 
the learning process we account for the unknown effects based 
on log-normal distribution, non-Gaussian statistical, and 
multifractal behavioral models [112]-[129]. To tame unknown 
threats using learning, we model a time-variant model of 
unknown complex malicious activities from partial 
observations, foreign interventions, and threat detections, e.g., 
to avoid revealing our learning models due to memory accesses 
or enhance trojan detection. 
A.3) Task Clustering 
Having detected the special features related to security and 
functionality, we use CD to partition the remaining graph into 
non-overlapping communities of tasks in order to: (1) Minimize 
security vulnerabilities, (2) Parallelize optimally the available 
S4oC elements, and (3) Minimize data communication 
overhead. We use an iterative approach based on complex 
network theories that pushes the gain on a quality function Q 
based on the 3 goals above, while adding neighboring tasks to 
clusters and stop when there is no further gain. The quality gain 
Q is similar to the modularity Q of [17] but including security 
expressions to monitor design quality in terms of side-channel 
minimization, encryption robustness, etc. 
B. Runtime Scheduling and Reconfiguration 
Given the task clusters, the goal is to find a mapping of those 
clusters onto the S4oC elements such that security is maximized 
subject to performance and energy constraints. To gain the 
maximum security, the following criteria have to be ideally 
satisfied: (i) The preferred logic type should match that of the 
element(s) corresponding to the mapped tasks, (ii) Given the 
bandwidth of the connections, data communications should be 
minimized such that the mapped tasks use elements that are 
sufficiently close to each other. 
    We consider the real-time, dynamic and uncertain nature of 
security threats, and underlying hardware platforms such as 
traffic and availability of elements. Also computing, 
connecting, memory and storage elements must work with the 
heterogeneous data streams with various types and levels of 
security needs. Hence, traditional planning and scheduling 
algorithms and heuristics would not be effective in handling a 
runtime security driven resource planning and scheduling. We 
therefore design distributed RL based intelligent schedulers to 
map tasks to the best suitable mapping and configuration of 
elements of S4oC. There are two advantages: (1) The technique 
learns and self-optimizes the mapping of tasks onto 
heterogeneous elements in order to gain the optimal security 
while meeting performance and energy constraints, (2) It is 
dynamic, therefore at runtime, based on the states of the 
environment and immediate rewards, agents decide the best 
policies for task mapping. In addition to the security driven 
design flow, S4oC continues to optimize itself while at work, 
running applications. It employs the distributed intelligent 
schedulers to schedule the set of domain specific tasks and 
reconfigure certain hardware components. 
B.1) Task Scheduling 
Task scheduling of our framework can be modeled and 
conveyed into learning agents as an enhanced Balls into Bins 
problem [136]. In our version of the problem, the balls (tasks) 
need to be constantly removed from the bins (input task queues) 
and mapped on the S4oC. Ideally agents should have a balanced 
workload, therefore an upper-bound is set for the workload, 
based on the rate of scheduled tasks.  
B.2) Distributed RL 
We believe RL with its trial-and-error nature to learn the 
optimal policy is very effective in runtime resource management 
and reconfiguration with dynamic applications [137],[138]. In 
our framework, states in an MDP (Markov Decision Process) 
environment represent the availability and type of S4oC 
elements, and actions represent resource reconfiguration and the 
task mapping onto elements. A distributed Q-learning approach 
is used to find the optimal policy. Multiple agents interact with 
the environment independently. The policy is defined based on 
the probability of choosing a mapping given the current 
availability and type of elements and the goal is to optimize the 
quality function Q. Busy elements would be avoided by 
assigning large negative rewards to prevent an action to assign a 
task to those busy elements. During exploration, such 
assignments should however not be forbidden. If the target 
element to which a task is mapped to is busy, we perform a local 
search to migrate the task to the nearby element with a cost, e.g., 
in terms of certain constraints related to communication 
security, network congestion and latency. 
Considering the unknown nature of some security threats 
and also more generally the large number of states and 
transitions, the system would not know all the transitions and 
their expected rewards. To avoid over-exploitation and getting 
 
         Figure 1: S4oC Framework – Flow and Components. 
trapped in local optimum, agents keep a balanced exploitation 
and exploration. For example, an ε-greedy action selection 
algorithm shows promising results [17]. The agent with a small 
probability ε randomly picks an element of S4oC to which the 
task is to explore the possible mappings. With a high probability 
1-ε, the agent chooses an element based on the Q value. All 
agents have access to the shared Q values and update them after 
receiving rewards from the environment. Hence, it is necessary 
to have incremental updates and approximate the quality 
function Q. This can be achieved by enforcing a critical section 
which allows only one agent access at a time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We presented S4oC, a self-optimizing, self-adapting secure 
SoC that learns to make offline and real-time adjustments to 
cope with security threats, some of which might be unknown at 
design time. Hierarchical multi-layer graph modeling is used to 
model the architecture of S4oC as well as tasks dependencies in 
the applications. More precisely, a four-layer graph, namely the 
model of computation, model of connection, model of memory, 
and model of storage layers capture the large number of 
elements including heterogeneous reconfigurable processing, 
connecting and memory elements and their interactions. Also. 
the target applications running on S4oC are modeled based on 
complex hierarchical graphs to capture application and task 
dependencies. Resource allocation includes application 
transformation, learning, and community detection. We use 
various fractal and statistical models to tame the impact of 
unknown security threats and incorporate that into the learning 
engines. The heterogeneous elements of S4oC include 
reconfigurable cores, HW accelerators, and modules for security 
solutions such as cryptographic, non-binary numerical, and PUF 
that adapt to the existing environment. S4oC manages the 
resources and reconfigures the elements in real-time, using 
security driven distributed RL. To optimize for security, the 
schedulers explore the best elements and reconfigurations onto 
which heterogeneous tasks should be mapped, according to 
application requirements and availability of S4oC elements. 
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